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Abstract—In this paper, a joint relay selection and power
allocation (JRP) scheme is proposed to enhance the physical layer
security of a cooperative network, where a multiple antennas
source communicates with a single-antenna destination in pres-
ence of untrusted relays and passive eavesdroppers (Eves). The
objective is to protect the data confidentially while concurrently
relying on the untrusted relays as potential Eves to improve
both the security and reliability of the network. To realize this
objective, we consider cooperative jamming performed by the
destination while JRP scheme is implemented. With the aim
of maximizing the instantaneous secrecy rate, we derive a new
closed-form solution for the optimal power allocation and propose
a simple relay selection criterion under two scenarios of non-
colluding Eves (NCE) and colluding Eves (CE). For the proposed
scheme, a new closed-form expression is derived for the ergodic
secrecy rate (ESR) and the secrecy outage probability as security
metrics, and a new closed-form expression is presented for the
average symbol error rate (SER) as a reliability measure over
Rayleigh fading channels. We further explicitly characterize the
high signal-to-noise ratio slope and power offset of the ESR
to highlight the impacts of system parameters on the ESR. In
addition, we examine the diversity order of the proposed scheme
to reveal the achievable secrecy performance advantage. Finally,
the secrecy and reliability diversity-multiplexing tradeoff of the
optimized network are provided. Numerical results highlight
that the ESR performance of the proposed JRP scheme for
NCE and CE cases is increased with respect to the number of
untrustworthy relays.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, untrusted relay, joint
relay selection and power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
LARGE-scale multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) sys-tem as a promising solution of the fifth-generation (5G)
wireless communication networks provides significant perfor-
mance gains in terms of energy saving and spectral efficiency
[1], [2]. This new technology deploys simple coherent pro-
cessing methods, e.g., maximum ratio transmission (MRT)
across arrays of hundreds of or even more antennas at base
station (BS) and supports tens of or more mobile users (MUs)
[1]–[3]. An attractive feature of large-scale MIMO systems is
that they offer a significant security improvement compared
to a conventional MIMO systems, as with large-scale multiple
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antennas (LSMA) at the BS, a narrow directional beam can be
radiated toward the desired terminal. Accordingly, the received
signal power at the desired terminal is several orders of magni-
tude higher than that at any non-coherent passive eavesdropper
(Eve) [3]1. However, the security benefits of LSMA systems
are severely hampered in cooperative networks, where the
intermediate nodes may be potential Eves [6].
Owing to the broadcast nature of wireless communication,
the information transmission between legitimate users can be
simply captured by Eves. Accordingly, physical layer security
(PLS) as a promising approach to enhance the confidentiality
of wireless communications has attracted a lot of interest
[7], [8]. Physical layer secure transmission is provisioned by
intelligently exploiting the time varying properties of fading
channels, instead of relying on conventional cryptographic
techniques [7]. Among the proposed PLS solutions, coopera-
tive relaying, cooperative jamming (CJ) and a mixed of these
two techniques have recently attracted a great deal of interest
[9]–[18]. Cooperative relaying can enhance the PLS through
implementing distributed beamforming or opportunistic relay-
ing (OR) [9], [10]. In contrast to distributed beamforming
that suffers from high complexity due to the need of large
overhead, OR imposes low system overhead by choosing only
one relay which offers the best secrecy performance for the
network [10]. As a complementary approach, CJ schemes
can also be implemented by the network’s nodes to transmit
jamming signals towards the Eves in order to degrade the
received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the Eves [11]–[18].
This goal can be achieved through applying the following
three methods: 1) Source-based jamming [11], [12] in which
the source transmits a mixed signal carrying the information
signal and the jamming signal, 2) Friendly jammer-based
jamming [12]–[15] in which a relay [12]–[14] or an external
friendly jammer (FJ) [15] contributes to provide confidential
communication, and 3) Destination-based CJ (DBCJ) [16]–
[24], in which the destination itself contributes to degrade the
received signal at an external Eve [16]–[18] or at a helper
intermediate node who may act as an Eve [6]. Among the
presented methods, the DBCJ policy can be implemented
simply compared to the first and second methods, where
the destination performs self-interference cancellation with
regard to its prior information of jamming signal. Contrary to
1It is worth noting that in contrast to passive eavesdropping, an active
Eve may cause pilot contamination at the BS and pose more serious security
problem to the network [4], [5].
2DBCJ, for the first and second methods, the destination must
be perfectly aware of the pre-defined jamming signal, while
it is unknown for the Eves. This a priori known jamming
signal, generated by using some pseudo-random codes or some
cryptographic signals, is hard to implement and transfer to the
destination confidentially. Transferring this known jamming
signal from the source to destination imposes more challenges
to the network, when an untrusted relay collaborates for data
transmission.
From a perspective of security, a trusted relay can friendly
assist to protect the confidential message from being eaves-
dropped by illegitimate nodes, while an untrusted relay may
intentionally overhear the information signal when relaying.
In some communication networks, an untrusted relay may
collaborate to provide a reliable communication [6]. This
scenario occurs in large-scale wireless systems such as hetero-
geneous networks, device-to-device (D2D) communications
and Internet-of-things (IoT) applications [5], where confiden-
tial messages are often retransmitted by multiple intermedi-
ate nodes. It is therefore necessary to answer this question
that whether exploiting the untrusted relay is still beneficial
compared with direct transmission (DT) and if so, what the
appropriate relaying strategy should be.
To achieve a positive secrecy rate in untrusted relaying
networks, the DBCJ policy was first introduced in [6]. Then
several recent works have investigated the performance of the
DBCJ policy in presence of a single [19], [20] or multiple
[21]–[24] untrusted relays. Specifically, the secrecy perfor-
mance of DBCJ with optimal power allocation (OPA) in pres-
ence of an untrusted amplify-and-forward (AF) relay investi-
gated in [19] and then comprehensively studied in [20]. Taking
into account non-colluding untrusted relaying, the authors in
[21]–[23] derived lower bound expressions for the ergodic
secrecy rate (ESR) performance in the absence [21], [22] or
presence [23] of source jamming. The researchers in [21]–[23]
indicate that increasing the number of untrustworthy relays
degrades the ESR in contrast to the case of trustworthy relays.
To be specific, the authors in [22] found that the diversity
order of OR is restricted to unity independent of the number
of untrusted relays. All the aforementioned works [21]–[24]
investigated the cooperative untrusted relaying networks in
absence of passive Eves and without considering achievable
secrecy rate optimization.
While the recent literature [19] presented a solid work for
OPA in presence of a single untrusted relay, the impact of
OPA on a more realistic cooperative network with multiple
untrusted relays and passive Eves has not been studied yet. In
this paper, motivated by the recent literature on LSMA-based
relaying systems [1], [2], [5], [19], [26], [27], we present a
comprehensive research to improve the PLS of cooperative
networks in presence of untrusted relays and passive Eves2.
Along this line, we consider a new cooperative network con-
sisting of a large-scale MIMO source, a destination, multiple
non-colluding untrusted AF relays [21]–[24], and multiple
non-colluding Eves (NCE) [10], [28] who hide their existence
in the network. In contrast to vast studies on the secrecy
2Henceforth, we interchangeably use the terms ‘passive Eve’ and ‘Eve’.
performance of untrusted relaying networks [19]–[24], we take
into account joint relay selection and power allocation (JRP)
in our network by considering the information leakage in the
second phase of transmission. We further investigate a worst-
case scenario, where passive Eves may collaborate together
to maximize the total received SNR. Toward this end, we
consider the scenario that the maximal ratio combining (MRC)
is performed over all the received signals from the source
and the selected relay to perform more harmful attacks. This
event is referred to as colluding Eves (CE) [28], [29]. As
a benchmark, we next study the conventional DT dispensing
with the relays to compare with the proposed JRP transmission
policy. In contrast to [30], in which DT policy with transmit
antenna selection is analyzed for MIMO wiretap channels,
we utilize the simple MRT beamformer [2] in our proposed
DT policy to maximize the received SNR at the intended
receiver. Furthermore, different from [30] that considered one
multiple antennas Eve, we consider two cases of NCE and
CE. Therefore, our system model and the related analysis are
completely different compared with [30].
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as
follows:
1) We develop a JRP scheme to maximize the instantaneous
secrecy rate of the network for both NCE and CE
cases. Our findings highlight that the large-scale MIMO
approach as a powerful mathematical tool offers a new
simple relay selection criterion. The proposed criterion
only requires the channel state information (CSI) of the
relays-destination links.
2) Based on the proposed JRP scheme, new closed-form
expressions are derived for the probability of positive
secrecy rate and the ESR of NCE and CE cases over
Rayleigh fading channels. Furthermore, new compact
expressions are derived for the asymptotic ESR. Our
asymptotic results highlight that the probability of posi-
tive secrecy transmission tends to one for the optimized
JRP scheme as the number of relaysK grows. Moreover,
we find that the ESR performance improves as K
increases. We further characterize the high SNR slope
and power offset of the ESR to highlight the impact of
system parameters on the ESR performance.
3) For the proposed JRP scheme, new closed-form ex-
pressions are derived for the secrecy outage probability
(SOP) of both NCE and CE cases over Rayleigh fading
channels. In order to shed insights into the system
performance, new simple expressions are derived for
the SOP in the high SNR regime. Our asymptotic
results highlight that the proposed JRP scheme enjoys
the diversity order of K . Next, the secrecy diversity-
multiplexing trade-off (DMT) is examined to express the
trade-off between the error probability and the data rate
of the proposed JRP scheme.
4) For DT policy, a new tight lower bound is derived for
the ESR of NCE and CE cases. We also derive a new
closed-form expression for the SOP of those cases. Our
results show that the high SNR slope and the secrecy
diversity order of this transmission policy are zero.
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Fig. 1. Secure transmission in a cooperative network in presence of multiple
untrusted relays and multiple passive Eves. Under DBCJ policy, relay i is
selected to amplify the source’s signal. The solid and dashed lines denote the
first and second phases of transmission, respectively.
5) To illustrate the reliability of the network, we calculate
the average symbol error rate (SER) as the performance
measure. New exact and asymptotic closed-form ex-
pressions are derived for the SER performance of the
proposed JRP scheme over Rayleigh fading channels.
Our results highlight that the proposed scheme offers the
diversity order of K . We further determine the reliability
DMT of the proposed scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we present the system model and preliminaries.
Next, in Section III, the relay selection criterion is introduced
and the related OPA is evaluated. Performance metrics are
evaluated in Section IV. Numerical results are presented in
Section V, followed by conclusions in Section VI.
Notation: We use bold lower case letters to denote vectors.
IN and 0N×1 denote the Identity matrix and the zeros matrix,
respectively. ‖.‖ and (.)H denote the Euclidean norm and
conjugate transpose operator, respectively; Ex{·} stands for
the expectation over the random variable x; Pr(·) denotes the
probability; fX(·) and FX(·) denote the probability density
function (pdf) and cumulative distribution function (cdf) of
the random variable (r.v.) X , respectively; CN (µ, σ2) denotes
a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian r.v. with mean µ
and variance σ2; Ei(x), Q(x) and Ψ(x) are the exponential
integral [31, Section (8.21)], the Q-function [31, Section
(8.25)] and the psi function [31, Section (8.25)], respectively.
[·]+ = max{0, x} and max stands for the maximum value.
⌈x⌉ is the smallest integer that is larger than or equal to x.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cooperative LSMA-based network consisting
of one multiple antennas source equipped with an array of
Ns antennas, one single-antenna destination,K single-antenna
untrusted AF relays and L single-antenna passive Eves3 as
depicted in Fig. 1. The untrusted relays in our network are
so-called semi-trusted, i.e., they are trusted at the service
level while they are untrusted at the data level4 [6]. All the
passive Eves are randomly located around the source, the relay
nodes and the destination, and they hide their existence in the
network. We mention that, in this paper, the term “malicious
node” includes both the untrusted relays and passive Eves.
We further assume that each node operates in a half-duplex
mode. Based on time division duplexing (TDD) operation, the
source obtains downlink CSI through uplink training. Then
the acquired CSI is used to generate the low implementation
complexity MRT precoding matrix [26].
We assume that the untrusted relays extract the information
signal solely based on its own observation and they adopt
selection combining (SC) [23], while relying on the Eves’
behavior, the following two eavesdropping scenarios are con-
sidered in our work:
1) Non-colluding eavesdroppers case: In this case, each
passive Eve individually overhears the information sig-
nal without any collaboration with other Eves. For this
case, we assume SC is applied at the Eves. As will be
validated via numerical examples, the presented analysis
can still be utilized for the case of MRC at the malicious
nodes.
2) Colluding eavesdroppers case: In this case, all the
passive Eves can connect to a data center to share their
information, leading to extract more information. For
this case, we assume MRC technique is applied at the
Eves to enhance the intercept probability. This case can
be considered as a worst-case scenario from the security
viewpoint [28].
Some additional assumptions and definitions are as follows:
• Complex Gaussian channel vector from the source to the
malicious node l: hsl ∼ CN (0Ns×1, µslINs).
• Complex Gaussian channel vector from the source to the
destination: hsd ∼ CN (0Ns×1, µsdINs).
• Complex Gaussian channel from the selected relay i to
the destination: hid ∼ CN (0, µid).
• Complex Gaussian channel from the selected relay i to
the malicious node l: hil ∼ CN (0, µil).
• All the channels satisfy the reciprocity theorem [21].
• The additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at each
receiver nm ,m ∈ {i, l, d}, is a zero-mean complex
Gaussian r.v. with variance N0.
• The total transmit power of each phase is limited by
P . One practical reason is the impact of co-channel
interference between adjacent networks which should be
taken into account in network design.
• ρ = P
N0
is the transmit SNR of the system.
3The presence of multiple Eves in a wireless network may be a realistic
scenario in which the malicious nodes act as harmful attackers to the
authorized terminals [5], [29].
4The service level trust conveys this concept that the accurate CSI of the
communication links can be given to the source through relay’s cooperation,
and the relay retransmits the received information signal toward the destina-
tion. However, this collaboration is untrustworthy at the data level, i.e., the
relay may decipher the confidential information from their received signal.
4• γsi = ρ‖hsi‖2, γid = ρ|hid|2, γil = ρ|hil|2, γld =
ρ|hld|2, γsd = ρ‖hsd‖2 and γmnull,l = ρ| h
H
sm
|hsm|hsl|2,
m ∈ {i, d}.
• γ¯si = ρµsi, γ¯id = ρµid, γ¯sl = ρµsl, γ¯ld = ρµld and
γ¯sd = ρµsd.
In the following, we describe two transmission policies
adopted in this paper to establish the PLS in our considered
network; namely DBCJ policy and DT policy.
A. DBCJ Policy
In some communication networks, the direct channel gain
between the source and destination may be so weak when
the source and destination are located far apart or within
heavily shadowed areas. In this condition, cooperative relaying
offers a promising solution. This scenario has been extensively
implemented in most previous works [10], [12]–[14], [18],
where the source and relays pertain to a group, while the
destination and passive Eves are placed in another group.
Some networks including this scenario are the mobile ad-hoc
networks (MANETs) [9], the LTE cellular systems [9], [14]
and the IoT network [5], [25]. The aim of DBCJ policy is to
deteriorate the received signal at the malicious nodes and to
not allow them to decipher the information signal.
Now, we proceed to highlight the necessity of adopting jam-
ming signal in our relay-aided network. Toward this end and
for the first step, we investigate the conventional AF relaying
scheme in which CJ is not utilized for data transmission. Since
the selected relay i itself is a curious node, the instantaneous
secrecy rate is given by [21]
Rconvs =
[1
2
log2
(
1 +
γsiγid
1 + γsi + γid
)
− 1
2
log2(1 + γsi)
]+
.
(1)
According to the fact that xy1+x+y < min(x, y) ≤ x [21],
one can easily conclude that Rconvs = 0. This result indicates
that the achievable secrecy rate of the conventional untrusted
relaying scheme without employing CJ is zero. Therefore, a
jamming signal must be sent to degrade the received signal
at the untrusted relay. In this paper, due to the simplicity of
DBCJ policy compared with source-based jamming and FJ-
based jamming, we adopt the DBCJ policy to provide perfect
secure transmission. It is worth noting that the analysis in
this paper can be simply extended to the case of utilizing an
external FJ [15].
Under DBCJ policy, since the nodes operate in a half-duplex
mode, the direct link between the source and destination is
missed. The whole transmission is performed based on a
time division multiple-access (TDMA) protocol including the
broadcast phase (first phase) and the relaying phase (second
phase). During the first phase, while the source transmits the
information signal with power λP , the destination concur-
rently radiates the artificial noise with power (1−λ)P , where
λ ∈ (0, 1) is the power allocation factor. It is worth noting
that this power allocation scheme provides insights for the
power allocation of the source and destination. This power
allocation approach has been exploited in several works for
both performance analysis and network optimization design
[10], [19]–[21], [23]. During the second phase, the selected
relay normalizes its received signal and forwards it with power
P . Finally, the destination decodes the source information
by subtracting the self-interference signal. Note that due to
the broadcast nature of wireless communication, the signal
transmitted in both the phases could be eavesdropped. In this
paper, contrary to most recent literature in multiple untrusted
relays [21]–[24] that ignored the information leakage in the
second phase of transmission, we consider a more realistic
scenario. In our considered scenario, the malicious nodes
intercept the transmissions of both the source and the selected
relay and then try to capture the information.
Denoting xs and xd as the information signal and the jam-
ming signal, respectively, the received signal at the malicious
node l (l ∈ {1, ...,K +L}) in first phase can be expressed as
y
(1)
l =
√
λPwHhslxs +
√
(1− λ)Phldxd + nl, (2)
where w = hsi‖hsi‖ represents the MRT beamformer at the
source and i (i ∈ {1, ...,K}) indicates the index of the selected
relay Ri. In the second phase, the relay amplifies its received
signal by an amplification factor of
G =
√
P
λP‖hsi‖2 + (1− λ)P |hid|2 +N0
, (3)
and broadcasts the message xi = Gyi. During the second
phase, all the malicious nodes hear the signal diffused by Ri.
Thus, the received signal at the malicious node l (l 6= i) can
be expressed as
y
(2)
l = Ghily
(1)
i + nl. (4)
Furthermore, at the destination, after performing self-
interference cancellation, the corresponding signal is given by
yD=
√
λPG‖hsi‖hidxs +Ghidnj + nd. (5)
Based on (2), the received signal-to-interference-and-noise-
ratio (SINR) at the selected relay i and the SINR at the
malicious node l during the first phase of transmission are
respectively, given by
γi =
λγsi
(1− λ)γid + 1 and γ
(1)
l =
λγinull,l
(1− λ)γld + 1 . (6)
By substituting (2) into (4), the received SINR at the malicious
node l during the second phase can be expressed as
γ
(2)
l =
λγsiγil
λγsi + (1 + (1− λ)γid)(1 + γil) . (7)
Moreover, by invoking (5), the SINR at the destination can be
obtained as
γDi =
λγsiγid
λγsi + (2 − λ)γid + 1 . (8)
The instantaneous secrecy rate corresponding to the selected
relay i can be expressed as [6]
R(i)s =
1
2
[
log2(1 + γDi)− log2(1 + γE)
]+
, (9)
where γE is the amount of information leaked to the malicious
5nodes. In case of NCE, the information leakage is given by
γNCEEi = max1≤l≤K+L,l 6=i
{
γi, γ
(1)
l , γ
(2)
l
}
. (10)
Moreover, the information leakage for CE case is given by
[28], [29]
γCEEi = max
{
max
1≤l≤K,l 6=i
{γi, γ(1)l , γ(2)l }︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information leakage 1
,
L∑
l=1
(γ
(1)
l + γ
(2)
l )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information leakage 2
}
, (11)
where information leakages 1 and 2 describe the information
leakage for untrusted relays and passive Eves, respectively.
Remark 1: In practical cooperative networks, e.g., an ultra-
dense heterogeneous wireless network, both trusted and un-
trusted relays exist. In such a network, to combat the po-
tential security attacks from untrusted relays, reliable relay
authentication techniques are implemented, i.e., the network
needs to discriminate between the trusted and untrusted relays
and then adopts the suitable secure transmission policy. The
authentication can be accomplished by traditional key-based
cryptographic methods or new physical layer authentication
(PLA) methods [32], [33]. A novel technique to implement
the PLA is the multi-attribute multi-observation (MAMO)
technique [33] in which the joint verification of the received
signal strength indicator (RSSI) and the hardware imperfec-
tions of the transceivers are exploited to authenticate the
relay nodes. PLA can also be implemented based on this
feature that the device-dependent hardware impairment in-
phase/quadrature (I/Q) imbalance related to the reception and
transmission of the relays is unique [32].
B. DT Policy
In DT policy, when the source transmits the information
signal to the destination, all the relays and the Eves listen.
Accordingly, the received SNR at the malicious node l and
the SNR at the destination are respectively, represented by
γl=γ
d
null,l
(a)≈ ρhˆdl
Nsµsd
and γD=ρ‖hsd‖2
(a)≈ Nsγsd, (12)
where hˆdl
∆
= |hHsdhsl|2. In (12), (a) follows from the law of
large numbers [34] due to large Ns. Applying the Lindeberg-
Levy central limit theorem [34], the r.v. hˆdl can be approxi-
mated as CN (0, Nsµsdµsl). It is worth pointing out that hˆdl is
very well approximated as a Gaussian r.v. even for small Ns
[35]. Therefore, γdnull,l can be considered as an exponential
r.v. with mean γdnull,l = ρµsl.
For DT policy, the information leakage for NCE and CE
cases can be respectively, expressed as [28], [29]
γNCEE = max
1≤l≤K+L
{γl} and γCEE = max
1≤l≤K
{
γl,
L∑
j=1
γj
}
.
(13)
III. JOINT RELAY SELECTION AND POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, we first introduce the optimal relay selection
scheme. Then motivated by the LSMA [1], [2], our proposed
JRP scheme is presented for both NCE and CE cases.
Let i⋆ denote the index of the best selected relay. A relay
that maximizes the instantaneous secrecy rate is selected as
i⋆ = arg max
1≤i≤K
R(i)s . (14)
The optimal relay selection criterion (14) requires the CSI of
both hops and all inter-relay channels. Therefore, it is rather
complicated to be implemented in practice, especially when
the number of source antennas and the number of relays are
large. To alleviate this issue, motivated by LSMA at the source,
we will propose a simple relay selection criterion for both NCE
and CE cases.
A. Non-colluding Eavesdroppers
For NCE case, based on (10), we need to find the maximum
received SINR at the malicious nodes. Due to deploying an
LSMA at the source and by leveraging the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, γ
(1)
l in (6) can be upper bounded by
γ
(1)
l =
λNCEγ
i
null,l
(1− λNCE)γld + 1 < γi, (15)
where λNCE represents the power allocation factor related to
NCE case. Furthermore, γ
(2)
l in (7) can be upper bounded by
γ
(2)
l <
λNCEγsiγil
(1 + (1− λNCE)γid)(1 + γil)
<
λNCEγsi
1 + (1 − λNCE)γid + 1 = γi. (16)
According to (6), (15) and (16), the information leakage in
(10) is simplified as γNCEE = γi. As such, the instantaneous
secrecy rate in (9) is simplified as
R(i)s =
1
2
[
log2
(1 + γDi
1 + γi
)]+
. (17)
Let φ(λNCE)
△
=
1+γDi
1+γi
. Notably φ(0) ≥ 1. Therefore,
for OPA φ(λ⋆NCE) ≥ 1, where λ⋆NCE is the OPA factor
corresponding to NCE case. Therefore, the operator [·]+ in
(17) can be dropped. For NCE case, we have the following
key result.
Proposition 1: For a large number of antennas at the source,
the function φ(λNCE) =
1+γDi
1+γi
is a quasiconcave function of
λNCE in the feasible set and the optimal solution is given by
λ⋆NCE =
√
2γid
γsi
. (18)
Proof: By substituting the expressions (6) and (8) into
(17), forming the function φ(λNCE), and then taking the first
derivative of it with respect to λNCE , we obtain
φ′(λNCE) =
− γsi
(
C1λNCE
2 + C2λNCE + C3
)
γid
(
λNCE
γsi
γid
− λNCE + 1
)2 (
λNCE
γsi
γid
− λNCE + 2
)2 ,
(19)
where C1 = (
γsi
γid
− 1)
(
(γid + 1)
γsi
γid
+ 2 γid − 1
)
, C2 =(
4 γid + 4
γsi
γid
− 4
)
and C3 = −2 γid+4. For a large number
6of antennas at the source, γsi ≫ γid, the coefficients are sim-
plified as C1 = (γid+1)
γ2si
γ2
id
, C2 = 4
γsi
γid
and C3 = −2γid+4.
By solving φ′(λNCE) = 0, the single feasible solution is
obtained as (18). Since φ′(1) = − γ3si(1+γid)
4γ3
id
< 0, we conclude
that φ(λNCE) is a quasiconcave function in the feasible set. 
Thanks to the LSMA at the source, by applying the law
of large numbers [34], we have γsi ≈ Nsγsi. Therefore, the
optimal solution (18) that requires the CSI of both hops can
be further simplified as
λ⋆NCE ≈
√
2|hid|2
Ns µsi
. (20)
The proposed OPA factor in (20) requires only the CSI of the
selected relay-destination link and the statistical mean of the
source-selected relay link.
By substituting (20) into (6) and (8), we obtain
γNCEEi = γi ≈
√
2 and γNCEDi ≈
γid
1 +
√
2
. (21)
Therefore, by using (21), the instantaneous secrecy rate in (9)
can be rewritten as
R(i)s =
1
2
log2
(1 + γCEDi
1 +
√
2
)
. (22)
The interesting result in (22) indicates that the instantaneous
secrecy rate only depends on the transmit SNR and the relay-
destination link. As a consequence, the high complexity relay
criterion (14) can be approximated as
i⋆ = arg max
1≤i≤K
γCEDi
= arg max
1≤i≤K
|hid|2. (23)
The proposed relay selection criterion in (23) requires only the
relays-destination channel gains and hence, enjoys from low
complexity and energy consumption. Furthermore, the relay
selection scheme in (23) can be easily implemented using the
distributed timer technique in [36].
In practice, the proposed JRP scheme can be implemented
as follows: Before data transmission, the relays are scheduled
to transmit pilot symbols [26]. Using the pilots, the source
and the destination can estimate their channels. Then
according to (23), the destination computes the strongest
link between itself and the relays and hence, the relay index
i⋆ is selected. Afterward, the destination broadcasts i⋆ and
pilot symbols to estimate the destination-relay i⋆ link. Then
the relay i⋆ forwards a quantized version of the estimated
destination-relay i⋆ to the source (l bits). Finally, both the
source and destination tune their optimal transmit power
to start communication. Accordingly, the overall overhead
required for broadcasting is equal to l + ⌈log2K⌉ bits.
B. Colluding Eavesdroppers
For CE case, the Eves jointly try to decode the information
signal based on MRC processing and hence, the amount
of overheard information increases. To tackle this problem,
more power should be dedicated to the destination to confuse
the Eves compared to λ⋆NCE in (18) and less power to the
source to transmit the information signal. Based on this,
λ⋆CE < λ
⋆
NCE ≪ 1, where λ⋆CE denotes the OPA factor for
CE case. Therefore, γ
(2)
l in (7) can be approximated as
γ
(2)
l ≈
λCEγsiγil
(1 + (1 − λCE)γid)(1 + γil)
(a)≈ λCEγsi
(1− λCE)γid + 1 =γi,
(24)
where (a) follows from the high SNR assumption. The inter-
esting result in (24) expresses that the amount of information
leakage to the malicious nodes in the second phase of transmis-
sion is approximately the same as the amount of information
leaked to the selected relay in the first phase. Based on this
new result and given this fact that, the received signal by
the malicious nodes in the second phase of transmission is
a degraded version of the emitted signal by the selected relay,
γCEEi in (11) is changed to
γCEEi = γi +
L∑
l=1
γ
(1)
l . (25)
For the sake of tractability, according to the fact that λ∗CE ≪ 1,
γi and γ
(1)
l in (6) can be rewritten as
γi≈ λCEγsi
(1 − λCE)(γid + 1) , γ
(1)
l ≈
λCEγ
i
null,l
(1− λCE)(γld + 1) . (26)
By substituting (26) into (25), we obtain
γCEEi =
λCE∆
1− λCE , (27)
where ∆ = γsi
γid+1
+
∑L
l=1
γinull,l
γld+1
. Following the same steps
as in Proposition 1, at the high SNR regime, the OPA factor
corresponding to CE case can be obtained as
λ∗CE =
√
2γid
γsi∆
. (28)
We can conclude from (28) that by increasing the number of
Eves, the most amount of the total power is assigned to the
destination to inject jamming signal.
Remark 2: In practice, often may not be feasible to achieve
the CSI of passive Eves. Based on this practical issue, we con-
sider a scenario, where only the second order statistics related
to the Eves’ are available which is a common assumption in the
literature [10], [13], [14], [18]. Furthermore, for mathematical
simplicity, we assume that the relaying and eavesdropping
channels are independent and identically distributed, i.e., for
relaying channels with 1 ≤ 1 ≤ K , we consider µsl = µsr and
µld = µrd, and for eavesdropping channels with 1 ≤ l ≤ L,
we consider µsl = µse and µld = µed [9], [13], [14].
Here, we consider the case with large number of passive
Eves. As will be observed in numerical examples, the analysis
are valid even for moderate number of Eves. Based on the law
of large numbers and since the first and the second hops are
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L∑
l=1
γinull,l
γld + 1
≈ L E
{
γinull,l
}
E
{ 1
γld + 1
}
= −Lµse e
1
ρµed
µed
Ei
(
− 1
ρµed
)
∆
= θˆ, (29)
where we used [31, Eq. (3.352.4)]. By substituting (29) into
λ⋆CE in (28) and then substituting into (27) and (8), we obtain
γCEEi ≈
√
2 + 2
γid
γsi
θˆ and γCEDi =
γid
1 +
√
2 + 2 γid
γsi
θˆ
.
(30)
By substituting γCEEi and γ
CE
Di
in (30) into (9), the instanta-
neous secrecy rate is obtained. Accordingly, we find that the
optimal relay selection scheme corresponding to the maximum
achievable secrecy rate needs the excessive implementational
overhead. The optimal relay selection based on both hops is
out of the scope of this paper. As such, we adopt the subopti-
mal simple relay selection scheme proposed for NCE case in
(23). We mention that since the second hop has a dominant
impact on quantifying the received SNR at the destination,
the relay selection criterion in (23) can be considered as a
suboptimal criterion to enhance the secrecy rate. Moreover,
in case of very LSMA at the source, the suboptimal relay
selection criterion in (23) will be the near-optimal one.
For the selected relay i∗ with the relay selection criterion in
(23) and with very LSMA at the source, we can use the well-
known approximation of minimummean square error (MMSE)
estimator as follows [1], [37]
γi∗d
γsi∗
≈ E
{γi∗d
γsi∗
}
(a)
= E
{
γi∗d
}
E
{ 1
γsi∗
}
(b)
=
µrd(Ψ(K + 1) + ̺)
(Ns − 1)µsr
△
= η, (31)
where ̺ = 0.577 [31] is Euler’s constant. In (31), (a) follows
from the fact that the two-hops are independent and (b) follows
from evaluating E{γi∗d} and E{ 1γsi∗ }. For the first case,
E{γi∗d}, we have
E
{
γi∗d
}
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1− Fγi∗d(x)
)
dx
= ρµrd
(
Ψ(K + 1) + ̺
)
, (32)
where the last equality follows from using the cdf of γi∗d
which can be obtained based on order statistics [34]
Fγi⋆d(γ) =
K∏
i=1
[
1− exp (− γ
γid
)
]
. (33)
= 1 +
2K−1∑
n=1
(−1)|un| exp
(
−
∑
i∈un
γ
γid
)
, (34)
where |un| denotes the cardinality of the n-th non-empty
subcollection of the K relays, and the last expression follows
from applying the binomial expansion theorem. For the second
case E{ 1
γsi∗
}, we used Lemma 2.9 in [38]
E
{ 1
γsi∗
}
=
1
(Ns − 1)ρµsr . (35)
Therefore, by substituting (31) into (30), we arrive at
γCEEi∗ ≈
√
2 + 2ηθˆ and γCEDi∗ =
γi∗d
1 +
√
2 + 2ηθˆ
. (36)
We conclude from (36) that the constant value γCEEi∗ increases
by increasing the number of Eves in the network. By equipping
the source with very LSMA Ns → ∞, this information
leakage tends to
√
2 the same as NCE case.
Comparing (21) for NCE and (36) for CE, we can define
the new parameter C to integrate the performance analysis for
NCE and CE cases. Based on this definition, we have
γE∗i ≈
√
2(1 + C) and γDi∗ ≈
γi∗d
1 +
√
2(1 + C)
, (37)
where C = 0 for NCE case and C = ηθˆ for CE case.
Remark 3: Both the network power optimization and
performance analysis presented in this paper, can be routinely
extended to the scenario that the untrusted relays and passive
Eves collaboratively decode the information signal based on
MRC technique.
Remark 4: According to the results in (15) and (24), the
received SNR at the malicious nodes in the second phase
of transmission is more than that one in the first phase of
transmission. Therefore, when SC is adopted at the malicious
nodes, and all of them cooperate to decode the information
signal, the network power optimization and performance
analysis are similar to the NCE case.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive new closed-form expressions for
the probability of positive secrecy rate, the ESR and the
SOP as the metrics of security and the SER as the reliability
measure. Both the proposed JRP scheme (which is based on
DBCJ policy) and the DT policy are studied.
A. Probability of Positive Secrecy Rate
In this section, we proceed to derive the probability of
positive secrecy rate for the proposed DBCJ and DT policies.
DBCJ Policy: By substituting (37) into (9) and using the
proposed relay selection criterion in (23), the probability of
positive secrecy rate can be expressed as
PDBCJpos = Pr
{
R(i
⋆)
s > 0
}
= Pr
{
γi⋆d > 2(1 + C) +
√
2(1 + C)
}
= 1− Fγi⋆d
(
2(1 + C) +
√
2(1 + C)
)
(a)
=1−
K∏
i=1
[
1−exp
(
− 2(1 + C) +
√
2(1 + C)
γid
)]
,
(38)
8where (a) follows from substituting (33). It can be concluded
from (38) that, the proposed JRP is not efficient when the
average transmit SNR of the second hop γid (which is a
function of the transmit SNR ρ and the distance-dependent
channel gain µid) is low. This observation is not surprising,
because when the DBCJ policy is adopted, due to the half-
duplex operation of the nodes, the direct link between the
source and destination is vanished. As such, the destination
only relies on the second hop to receive the information signal
form the source. Consequently, the reliability of confidential
communication is degraded when the relays are far from the
destination or the transmit SNR is low. In the high SNR
regime, (38) is simplified as
PDBCJpos = 1−
(
2(1 + C) +
√
2(1 + C)
)K K∏
i=1
1
γid
. (39)
We deduce from (39) that the probability of positive secrecy
rate approaches one as the transmit SNR or the number
of relays increases. The reason is that as K grows, the
occurrence probability of a stronger channel between relays
and the destination increases and thus, PDBCJpos approaches one.
DT Policy: For this policy, we will study the NCE case and
CE case separately, below.
1) NCE Case: In this case, by combining (9), (10) and (12),
the probability of positive secrecy rate can be obtained as
PDT,NCEpos = Pr
{
log2
(
1 +Nsγsd
)
− log2
(
1 + max
1≤l≤K+L
γdnull,l
)
>0
}
≈
K+L∏
l=1
(
1− e−
Nsµsd
µsl
)l
, (40)
where the last expression follows from the fact that γdnull,l
can be approximated as an exponential r.v., as mentioned in
Section II-B. This result reveals that PDT,NCEpos → 0 as the
number of malicious nodes goes to infinity. Furthermore, one
can obtain PDT,NCEpos → 1 as Ns → ∞, which is an intuitive
observation, since by increasing Ns, the source with an LSMA
focuses the transmission energy toward the direction of the
selected relay. Hence, the strength of the received signals at
the malicious nodes will be low enough. Based on this, the
malicious nodes fail to extract the information. Furthermore, in
contrast to DBCJ policy that the confidential communication is
solely dependent on the second hop channel, expression (40)
illustrates that since the probability of positive secrecy rate
for DT policy is independent of the transmit SNR, the DT
can offer secure transmission even for low transmit SNRs by
deploying large number of source antennas Ns.
2) CE Case: As mentioned in (13), in this case γCEE =
max1≤l≤K{γl,
∑L
j=1 γj}. To obtain the probability of positive
secrecy rate, we first find the cdf of γCEE . Using order statistics
[34], the cdf of γRE
∆
= max1≤l≤K{γl} is given by [9], [34]
FγRE (γ) = 1 +
2K−1∑
n=1
(−1)|un| exp
(
−
∑
l∈un
γ
γsl
)
. (41)
The following lemma from [39] helps to obtain the cdf of
γEveE
∆
=
∑L
j=1 γj in (13).
Lemma 1: Let {Xi}ni=1, n > 1, be independent exponential
r.vs with distinct averages µi. Then the cdf of their sum W =
X1 +X2 + ...+Xn is given by
FW (x) =
n∑
j=1
Γ(µj)
(
1− e−
x
µj
)
, x > 0. (42)
where Γ(µj)
∆
=
(∏n
i=1
1
µi
)
µj∏
n
k 6=j,k=1(
1
µk
− 1
µj
)
.
Using (41) and leveraging Lemma 1, the cdf of γCEE in (13)
can be expressed as
FγCE
E
(γ) = FγR
E
(γ)FγEve
E
(γ)
=
(
1+
2K−1∑
n=1
(−1)|un| exp (−
∑
l∈un
γ
γsl
)
)( L∑
j=1
Γ(γ¯sj)(1− e−
x
γ¯sj )
)
.
(43)
Hence, the probability of positive secrecy rate for DT policy
under the presence of CE can be expressed as
PDT,CEpos = FγCEE (Nsγsd), (44)
where the cdf of γCEE is in (43). From (44), we observe that
when Ns → ∞, the secure communication is established,
while for large number of malicious nodes, the secure trans-
mission is harmed.
B. Ergodic Secrecy Rate
The ESR as a useful secrecy metric characterizes the
average of the achievable instantaneous rate difference
between the legitimate channel and the wiretap channel. In
the following, we derive new accurate closed-form expressions
for the ESR of both DBCJ based and DT policies.
DBCJ Policy: By substituting (37) into (9) and using the
relay selection criterion in (23), the ESR can be written as
RDBCJs =
1
2 ln 2
∫ ∞
0
ln
(
1 +
γ
1 +
√
2(1 + C)
)
fγi⋆d(γ)dγ
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
√
2(1 + C)
)
(a)
=
1
2 ln 2
∫ ∞
0
[
1− Fγi⋆d(γ)
]
γ + 1 +
√
2(1 + C)
dγ
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
√
2(1 + C)
)
, (45)
where (a) follows from using integration by parts. To obtain
a closed-form solution for the ESR, by substituting (34) into
(45) and using [31, Eq. (3.352.4)], we get
RDBCJs =
1
2 ln 2
2K−1∑
n=1
(−1)|un|e
∑
i∈un
1+
√
2(1+C)
γid
× Ei
(
−
∑
i∈un
1 +
√
2(1 + C)
γid
)
− 1
2
log2(1 +
√
2(1 + C)).
(46)
9We remark that the ESR in (46) is explicitly characterized by
the average channel gains between the relays and destination,
and the transmit SNR of the network. As observed, increasing
the number of antennas at the source Ns has no impact on
the ESR performance. For a single-relay network without any
passive Eve, the ESR in (46) is simplified as
RDBCJs = −
1
2 ln 2
e
1+
√
2
γ1d Ei
(
− 1 +
√
2
γ1d
)
− 1
2
log2(1 +
√
2),
(47)
which was derived in [19], [20]. As such, the works [19], [20]
can be considered as a special case of our work.
We can further calculate the ESR performance in the high
SNR regime when ρ→∞ by applying the general asymptotic
form given by [30]
R∞s = S∞
(
log2 ρ− L∞
)
, (48)
where S∞ is the high SNR slope in bits/s/Hz/ (3 dB) and L∞
is the high SNR power offset in 3 dB units. These parameters
are two key performance factors that explicitly examine the
ESR performance at the high SNR regime which are defined
respectively, as [30]
S∞ = lim
ρ→∞
R∞s
log2 ρ
and L∞ = lim
ρ→∞
(
log2 ρ−
R∞s
S∞
)
. (49)
We mention that the high SNR slope is also recognized as
the maximum multiplexing gain or the number of degrees of
freedom [30]. Based on (37), in the high SNR regime with
ρ → ∞, we have ln(1 + γDi) ≈ ln(γDi). As such, the ESR
of the proposed JRP scheme can be represented by
R∞s =
1
2 ln 2
E
{
ln(γi⋆d)
}
− log2
(
1 +
√
2(1 + C)
)
. (50)
By taking the derivative of (34) with respect to γ to obtain
the pdf of γi∗d, and then applying [31, Eq. (4.331.1)], the
asymptotic ESR can be obtained as
R∞s =
1
2 ln 2
( 2K−1∑
n=1
(−1)|un|
[
ln(
∑
i∈un
1
γid
) + ̺
])
− log2
(
1 +
√
2(1 + C)
)
. (51)
Using (49), the high SNR slope is given by
S∞ =
1
2
, (52)
where we used the fact that
∑2K−1
n=1 (−1)|un| = −1. Expres-
sion (52) highlights that the number of source antennasNs and
the presence of collaborative eavesdropping have no impact on
the ESR slope.
Furthermore, the high SNR power offset is derived as
L∞ = −
2K−1∑
n=1
(−1)|un| log2(
∑
i∈un
1
µid
) +
̺
ln 2
+ 2 log2
(
1 +
√
2(1 + C)
)
, (53)
where a decrease in the power offset corresponds to an
increase in the ESR. Expression (53) characterizes the
impacts of µid, the number of relays K and the number of
passive Eves L on the ESR and shows that the power offset
is independent of Ns. As expected, we find that increasing
the number of passive Eves increases the ESR power offset
which corresponds to a decrease in the ESR.
DT Policy: In the following, we investigate the ESR per-
formance of DT policy for both NCE and CE cases.
1) NCE Case: In this case, by substituting γNCEE in (13)
and γD in (12) into (9), we have
RDT,NCEs = E
{[
log2
(
1 +Nsγsd
)
− log2
(
1 + max
1≤l≤K+L
γdnull,l
)]+}
(54)
≥
[
log2
(
1 +Nsγsd
)
− E
{
log2
(
1 + max
1≤l≤K+L
γdnull,l
)}]+△
= RDT,NCEs,LB ,
(55)
where the inequality follows from the fact E
{
max{x, y}
}
≥
max
{
E{x},E{y}
}
[21]. Following the same steps presented
to derive the ESR of DBCJ policy, (55) is given by
RDT,NCEs,LB =
[
log2
(
1 +Nsγsd
)
− 1
ln 2
2K+L−1∑
n=1
(−1)|vn|e
∑
i∈vn
1
γsj Ei
(
−
∑
i∈vn
1
γsj
)]+
,
(56)
where |vn| denotes the cardinality of the n-th non-empty
subcollection of the K + L nodes. We remark that at the
high SNR regime, the instantaneous secrecy rate (54) is further
simplified as
RDT,NCEs =
[
2 log2
(
Nsµsd
)
− log2
(
max
1≤l≤K+L
hˆld
)]+
. (57)
Expression (57) states that the instantaneous secrecy rate
of DT is independent of the transmit SNR, i.e., a secrecy
rate ceiling appears when the transmit SNR increases. In
other words, the high SNR slope of DT policy is zero. We
conclude that, unlike the DBCJ policy, the DT cannot achieve
high secure transmission rates. Furthermore, as observed
from (57), the ESR decreases by increasing the number of
malicious nodes while the ESR increases as Ns grows.
10
2) CE Case: In this case, by using γCEE in (13), a tight
lower bound for the ESR of CE case can be obtained as
RDT,CEs,LB =
[
log2
(
1 +Nsγsd
)
− E
{
log2
(
1 + γCEE
)}]+
=
[
log2
(
1 +Nsγsd
)
+
L∑
j=1
Γ(γ¯sj)e
1
γ¯sj Ei
(
− 1
γ¯sj
)
−
2K−1∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
(−1)|un|Γ(γ¯sj)e
∑
l∈un
1
γsl Ei(− 1
γ¯sl
)
+
2K−1∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
(−1)|un|Γ(γ¯sj)e
1
γ¯sj
+
∑
l∈un
1
γsl
× Ei
(
− 1
γ¯sj
−
∑
l∈un
1
γsl
)]+
, (58)
where we used the cdf of γCEE in (43) and [31, Eq. (3.352.4)].
Similar to NCE case, a secrecy rate ceiling appears in the
high SNR regime which limits the secrecy performance of
DT policy.
C. Secrecy Outage Probability
The overall SOP denoted by Pout is defined as the
probability that a system with the instantaneous secrecy rate
Rs is unable to support the target transmission rate Rt, i.e.,
Pout = Pr
{
Rs < Rt
}
.
DBCJ Policy: By Substituting (37) into the SOP definition,
we obtain
PDBCJout = Pr
{
γi⋆d < R˜t
}
= Fγi⋆d
(
R˜t
)
=
K∏
i=1
[
1− exp
(
− R̂t
γid
)]
, (59)
where R˜t =
(
1+
√
2(1 + C)
)(
22Rt(1 +
√
2(1 + C))− 1
)
.
To derive (59), we used the cdf of γi∗d in (34). Expression (59)
indicates that the SOP approaches zero as the transmit SNR
ρ→∞. For a single-relay case and without passive Eve, the
overall SOP is simplified as
PDBCJout = 1− exp
(
− (1 +
√
2)(22Rt(1 +
√
2)− 1)
γ1d
)
, (60)
which was derived in our previous work [20]. Therefore, this
new work extends the recent work [20].
Now, we look into the high SNR regime and investigate
the diversity order. In the high SNR regime, the closed-form
expression in (59) can be written as
PDBCJout ≈ (R˜t)K
K∏
i=1
1
γid
. (61)
By inspecting (61), we interestingly find that the diversity
order of the system equals to the number of untrusted relays
K . To justify this new result intuitively, we can say that in the
considered LSMA-based network, under applying the OPA,
the first hop channel becomes deterministic and only the
second hop contributes for signal transmission. Increasing the
number of untrusted relays, actually increases the probability
of having a stronger link in the second hop. Therefore, the
secrecy diversity order of the system increases which in turn
decreases the secrecy outage probability.
DT Policy: To study the SOP of DT policy, we have two
cases of NCE and CE.
1) NCE Case: By substituting γNCEE in (13) and γD in
(12) into (9), and then formulating the SOP, we obtain
PDT,NCEout = Pr
{
log2
( 1 +Nsγsd
1 + max1≤l≤K+L γdnull,l
)
< Rt
}
= 1−Pr
{
max
1≤l≤K+L
γdnull,l <
1 +Nsγsd
2Rt
− 1
}
= 1−
K+L∏
l=1
[
1− exp
(
− 1
γsl
(
1 +Nsγsd
2Rt
− 1)
)]
.
(62)
The expression (62) indicates that PDT,NCEout → 1 as the
number of malicious nodes grows. One can easily conclude
from (62) that an error floor occurs at the high SNR regime.
This means that the secrecy diversity order of MRT-based DT
policy is zero. This result is the same as the results in [30],
where the authors considered transmit antenna selection at
the transmitter and receive generalized selection combining
at the receiver. Moreover, we can conclude PDT,NCEout → 0 as
Ns →∞.
2) CE Case: In this case, we obtain
PDT,CEout = Pr
{
log2
(1 +Nsγsd
1 + γCEE
)
< Rt
}
= 1− FγCE
E
(1 +Nsγsd
2Rt
− 1
)
, (63)
where FγCEE (γ) is in (43). Expression (63) states that similar
to NCE case, the SOP of CE case tends to a constant in the
high SNR regime. Furthermore, we find that the SOP of CE
case approaches zero as Ns →∞.
D. Average Symbol Error Rate
In this subsection, we evaluate the SER of the proposed
JRP scheme. The SER of the DT scheme is available in the
literature [39, Sec. 3] and is omitted for brevity.
The instantaneous SER of coherent modulation is in the
form of Ps = αmQ(
√
βmγD), where γD represents the
received SNR, and αm and βm depend on the modulation
type. Specifically, for rectangularM -ary quadrature amplitude
modulation, αm = 4(1 − 1√
M
) and βm =
3
M−1 . Moreover,
for M -ary phase-shift keying (M ≥ 4), αm = 2 and
βm = 2 sin
2 π
M
[39].
Using the average SER of coherent modulation as [39]
Ps =
αm√
2π
∫ ∞
0
FγD
( t2
βm
)
exp(− t
2
2
)dt, (64)
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the average SER of the proposed JRP system using (33) can
be expressed as
PDBCJs =
αm√
2π
∫ ∞
0
exp(− t
2
2
)
×
K∏
i=1
[
1− exp
(
− (1 +
√
2(1 + C))t2
βmγid
)]
dt
=
αm
2
(
1 +
2K−1∑
n=1
(−1)|un|√
1 + 2
∑
i∈un
1+
√
2(1+C)
βmγid
)
,
(65)
where the last expression follows from applying the bino-
mial expansion and the fact
∫∞
0
e−qx
2
dx = 12
√
π
q
[31, Eq.
(3.318.3)]. For a single-relay system, the average SER is
Ps=
αm
2
(
1−
√
βmγ1d
βmγ1d + 2 +
√
2
)
. (66)
In the high SNR regime, i.e., γ¯id → ∞, we have 1 −
exp(− (1+
√
2C)t2
βmγid
) ≈ (1+
√
2C)t2
βmγid
. Accordingly, the expression
(65) can be approximated as
PDBCJs ≈
αm
(
1 +
√
2(1 + C)
)K
√
2πβKm
∏K
i=1 γid
∫ ∞
0
t2ke−
t2
2 dt. (67)
Using the facts that
∫∞
0 x
2ke−px
2
dx = (2k−1)!!
2(2p)k
√
π
p
[31, Eq.
(3.416.3)] with (2k−1)!! = (2k)!2kk! , the high SNR approximation
of the overall average SER can be obtained as
PDBCJs ≈
αm(2K)!(1 +
√
2(1 + C))K
βKm2
K+1K!
∏K
i=1 γid
. (68)
By inspecting (68), we observe that the DBCJ policy achieves
a diversity order of K .
V. DIVERSITY-MULTIPLEXING TRADEOFF
As is known, multi-antenna systems offer two different
types of benefits in a fading channel: diversity order and
multiplexing gain [39]. The DMT describes this trade-off by
presenting a trade-off between the error probability and the
data rate of a system [39]. Recently, the secrecy DMT of a
MIMO wiretap channel has been addressed in [40], where a
zero-forcing (ZF) transmit scheme is utilized. In the following,
we evaluate the DMT of the proposed JRP scheme from the
perspectives of security and reliability.
A. Secrecy Perspective
Let d and r be the diversity order and the multiplexing
gain of the presented system, defined as d
△
= − lim
ρ→∞
log2 Pout
log2 ρ
and r
△
= lim
ρ→∞
Rt
log2 ρ
, respectively. Substituting (61) into the
diversity order definition and using Rt = r log2 ρ, the DMT
can be obtained as
d = lim
ρ→∞
∑K
i=1 log2 γid−K log2
(
22Rt(1 +
√
2(1 + C))−1
)
log2 ρ
= K(1− 2r). (69)
It is observed that when the multiplexing gain is not utilized
(r→ 0), the diversity order equals the maximum value d = K ,
which is consistent with our previous results. On the other
hand, a multiplexing gain of r = 0.5 is achieved as d → 0.
This is because, in the presented cooperative network, it takes
two time slots to complete the transmission of one traffic flow,
and hence, the maximum multiplexing gain of such network
is just 0.5. This can be dealt with utilizing a two-way network.
B. Reliability Perspective
In this case, d = − lim
ρ→∞
log2 Ps
log2 ρ
. By substituting (68) into
the diversity order definition and using Rt = r log2 ρ, the
DMT is given by
d = K(1− r). (70)
One can conclude from (70) that in the absence of a multi-
plexing gain (r → 0), the diversity order is K . On the other
hand, a multiplexing gain of r = 1 is achieved as d→ 0.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, numerical examples are presented to verify
the accuracy of the derived performance metrics (ESR, overall
SOP and average SER) for the proposed JRP transmission
scheme. Numerical curves for the exact JRP scheme, marked
with filled circles, are obtained using the optimum relay
selection criterion in (14) together with the OPA, which is
numerically evaluated for a finite number of source antennas
using the bisection method. We compare our proposed JRP
scheme for both the NCE and CE cases with other well-known
transmission schemes as listed below:
1) Equal power allocation (EPA) between source and des-
tination (λNCE = λCE = 0.5) with random relay
selection, which is denoted by “EPRR”,
2) OPA between source and destination with random relay
selection, which is denoted by “OPRR”,
3) EPA between source and destination with the optimum
relay selection in (14), which is denoted by “EPRS”,
4) The exact JRP scheme for the scenario of adopting the
MRC technique at the malicious nodes for NCE case,
and
5) The DT policy, wherein both the untrusted relays and
passive Eves are considered as pure Eves.
To verify the accuracy of the derived LSMA-based expres-
sions for the ESR of JRP, the SOP of JRP, the SER of JRP, the
ESR of DT for NCE, the ESR of DT for CE, the SOP of DT for
NCE, the SOP of DT for CE and the SER of JRP in (46), (59),
(65), (56), (58), (62), (63) and (65) respectively, we conduct
Monte-Carlo simulations, where results are shown in Figs. 2
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Fig. 2. ESR versus the transmit SNR for the NCE case and for different
transmission schemes. We consider K = {1, 5} relays, the multi-passive Eve
L = 5 scenario, and Ns = 16 source antennas. The asymptotic curves for
the JRP scheme are shown with dashed lines using Eq. (51), while the filled
circles depict the Monte-Carlo simulations.
- 7. Furthermore, we plot the derived asymptotic expressions
for the ESR, SOP and SER of the proposed JRP scheme given
by (51), (61) and (68), respectively. As will be observed from
Figs. 2 - 7, our LSAM-based closed-form expressions well
matched with the simulation results, and the asymptotic curves
well approximate the exact curves in the high SNR regime. For
simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the
source, destination and relay(s) are located at the positions
(-1,0), (0,0), and (1,0) respectively, and the passive Eves are
placed near the relays to overhear the maximum information.
Unless otherwise stated, the values of network parameters
are: number of antennas at the source Ns = 16, number of
untrusted relays K = {1, 5}, number of passive Eves L = 5,
the target rate Rt = 1 bits/s/Hz and the distance-dependent
path loss factor α = 3.
Figure 2 shows the achievable ESR versus the transmit SNR
ρ for NCE case. Our observations are summarized as follows:
1) The ESR performance of the proposed JRP scheme is a
monotonically increasing function of the transmit SNR ρ
while the ESR of the DT scheme converges to a constant
value as presented in Section IV-B. The reason behind
this behavior of the JRP scheme is that the injected
jamming signal by the destination only degrades the
received information signal at the malicious nodes and
has no effect on the overall two-hop signal reception at
the destination. As such, the secrecy performance of the
DBCJ-based JRP scheme is superior to the performance
of the DT policy in the high SNR regime, while the
opposite behavior is observed at the low SNR regime.
The reason is that by equipping the source with an
LSMA and adopting an MRT beamformer the received
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Fig. 3. ESR versus the transmit SNR for the CE case and for different
transmission schemes. We consider K = {1, 5} relays, the multi-passive Eve
L = 5 scenario, and Ns = 16 source antennas. The asymptotic curves for
the JRP scheme are shown with dashed lines using Eq. (51), while the filled
circles depict the Monte-Carlo simulations.
SNR at the destination for DT becomes considerable,
while the information leakage is negligible as computed
in (12). We also mention that, as discussed in Section IV-
A, the secrecy performance of the JRP is not satisfactory
when the average transmit SNR of the second hop is
low. Therefore, the proposed JRP suffers from w secrecy
performance loss in the low SNR regime.
2) The ESR performance of the JRP scheme increases as
K grows, which can be concluded form (22). This is
because by increasing K , the probability of emerging
a stronger channel between the relays and destination
grows and accordingly, the secrecy rate increases. Con-
trary to the JRP scheme, the ESR of the DT policy de-
creases by increasing K . The reason is that according to
(12), the received SNR at the destination is deterministic,
while based on (13), the amount of information leakage
increases as K grows.
3) The secrecy rate advantage of JRP scheme compared
with EPRR is obvious. For example, the SNR gap
between the proposed JRP scheme and EPRR is about
8 dB for K = 1 case; this gap is about 13 dB for
K = 5 case to achieve the target transmission rate of 2
bits/s/Hz.
4) The secrecy performance of the proposed JRP scheme
with SC at the malicious nodes is close to the secrecy
performance of the exact JRP with MRC technique.
In Fig. 3, we plot the ESR performance versus the transmit
SNR ρ for the CE case. As can be seen, the proposed JRP
scheme which is based on the near-optimal relay selection cri-
terion in (23) is in perfect agreement with the exact numerical
results across the entire SNR range of interest. As can be seen
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ρ = 20 dB. We consider the multi-Eve scenario with L = {5, 50}, where the
number of source antennas Ns = 256. The filled circles are obtained with
the Monte-Carlo simulations.
from Fig. 3, the ESR performance of the proposed JRP scheme
increases by increasing K , while the opposite is observed for
DT policy. Furthermore, we can conclude from Fig. 3 that
the ESR of the proposed scheme significantly outperforms the
EPRR policy.
Figure 4 examines the impact of the number of untrusted
relaysK on the ESR performance of the proposed JRP scheme
for the NCE and CE cases. We set the number of source
antennas to Ns = 256 and the transmit SNR ρ = 20 dB.
We also consider two cases of small L = 5 and large L = 50
number of passive Eves. The following observations can be
made from Fig. 4:
1) As predicted by the analytical expressions and discus-
sions in Section IV-B, the ESR performance of the
proposed JRP scheme for NCE and CE cases is a
monotonically increasing function of the number of
untrusted relays K . This new result highlights that,
unlike the results in [21], [22], the proposed LSMA-
based scheme increases the secrecy rate of the network
by utilizing more untrusted relays.
2) The proposed JRP scheme for the NCE case with any
number of Eves offers a superior ESR performance
relative to the CE case with large number of Eves
L = 50. This event can be justified simply based on the
new results presented in Section III-B. The reason is that
by equipping the source with an LSMA, the amount of
information leaked to the malicious nodes in the first of
transmission is negligible compared to that one in the
second phase. Therefore, for CE with small number of
Eves L = 5, the ESR performance is the same as NCE
case, while with large number of Eves, some information
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Fig. 5. Overall SOP versus the transmit SNR for the NCE case with K =
{1, 5} relays and L = 5 passive Eves. The number of source antennas is set
to Ns = 16 and the target rate to Rt = 1 bits/s/Hz. The asymptotic curves
are shown with dashed lines using Eq. (61), while the filled circles depict the
Monte-Carlo simulations.
can be extracted by Eves, leading to ESR loss relative
to NCE case.
3) When OPRR is adopted in the network, the ESR perfor-
mance for both NCE and CE cases is a constant function
of K . The reason is that when one relay is randomly
selected out of K available relay nodes and OPA is
applied, it is statically equivalent to the single-relay
scenario with OPA. For large number of Eves L = 50,
due to the collaboration between Eves, the ESR of CE
case is somewhat fewer than the NCE case.
4) The ESR performance of DT policy for NCE is a
decreasing function of K . The reason is that by increas-
ing K , the probability of emerging a stronger wiretap
channel increases and therefore, the ESR decreases.
However, for CE with large number of Eves, the ESR is
a constant function with respect to K . The reason is that
both the amount of information leakage and the received
SNR at the destination are independent of the number
of untrusted relays. We note that according to (13) and
the law of large numbers, we have γCEE =
∑L
j=1 γj ≈
Lρµse which is independent of K .
5) The ESR performance of EPRS for both NCE and
CE cases is an increasing function of K . This result
highlights the effectiveness of relay selection in LSMA-
based security networks even without applying OPA.
In Figs. 5 and 6, we compare the overall SOP versus the
transmit SNR ρ for NCE and CE cases, respectively. The
results in Figs. 5 and 6 indicate that the SOP performance ad-
vantage of our proposed secure transmission scheme compared
to the EPRR policy. As can be readily observed from these
figures, unlike DT policy that the SOP performance converges
14
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Fig. 6. Overall SOP versus the transmit SNR for the CE case with K =
{1, 5} relays and L = 5 passive Eves. The number of source antennas is
set to Ns = 16 and the target rate to Rt = 1 bits/s/Hz. The asymptotic
curves are shown with dashed lines using Eq. (61), while the filled circles
depict the Monte-Carlo simulations.
to a nonzero constant as ρ→∞, the SOP of the proposed JRP
scheme for both NCE and CE cases approaches zero in the
asymptotic SNR regime. Furthermore, as mentioned in Section
IV-C, the proposed JRP scheme achieves the diversity order
equal to the number of untrusted relays, which can be obtained
simply from the asymptotic curves in Figs. 5 and 6. Finally,
we observe from Fig. 6 that, while the DT policy fails to
establish confidential communication for target secrecy rate of
Rt = 1 bits/s/Hz, the proposed JRP scheme enhances the
PLS remarkably. This highlights the efficiency of the proposed
JRP scheme.
To study the level of reliability of the proposed secure
transmission scheme, we plot the average SER metric in Fig.
7. We consider the multi-relay scenario withK = 5 and QPSK
modulation. For this network topology, the DT policy offers
a superior average SER relative to the proposed JRP scheme.
The reason is that the DT policy provisions a better SNR at the
destination compared with the proposed scheme. Furthermore,
as observed, the average SER of NCE case is lower than the
CE case. The reason is that according to the received SINR
at the destination in (37), we have γCED ≤ γNCED . Moreover,
we can conclude from Fig. 7 that the proposed JRP scheme is
better compared to OPRR. For example, the SNR gap between
the optimized network and OPRR is approximately 13 dB for
NCE and 12 dB for CE, respectively, when Ps = 10
−2. This
is because the proposed JRP selects the relay with the largest
second hop channel to signal transmission. Consequently, the
achievable reliability of the proposed scheme is higher than the
random relay selection of the OPRR policy. Evidently, unlike
the OPRR, the proposed scheme attains diversity order d = 5.
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Fig. 7. Average SER versus the transmit SNR for the number of relays K = 5
and multi-Eve L = 5 scenario. The number of source antennas Ns = 16 and
QPSK modulation is used. The asymptotic curves are shown with dashed lines
using Eq. (68), while the filled circles depict the Monte-Carlo simulations.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed secure transmission in a two-hop
relaying network including a multiple antennas source, a single
antenna destination, single antenna untrusted relays and single
antenna passive Eves. We considered two practical scenarios
of NCE and CE. A novel JRP scheme has been proposed for
security enhancement of the two NCE and CE networks. For
the proposed JRP scheme, a new closed-form expression was
presented for the ESR and the SOP as security metrics, and a
new closed-form expression was derived for the average SER
as a reliability measure over Rayleigh fading channels. We
further evaluated the high signal-to-noise ratio slope and power
offset of the ESR to reveal the impacts of system parameters on
the achievable ESR. Our findings highlighted that the diversity
order of the proposed JRP scheme is equal to the number of
untrusted relays. Numerical results presented that the ESR of
the proposed JRP scheme for NCE and CE cases increases as
the number of untrustworthy relays grows.
It would be interesting to extend the results in this paper to
the case, where trusted relays are also exist in the network.
Thus, we would like to consider this case as future work.
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